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that uncertainty. I think it probable that the findings and recommendations of a commission so constituted would have high moral authority and carry very great weight with both governments. They would be likely to furnish, if not a complete and conclusive decision, at least a basis for a friendly agreement. The very appointment of such a joint commission by the two governments would be apt at once to remove the point of honor, the most dangerous element, from the controversy, and thus go very far to relieve the apprehension of disastrous possibilities which usually has so unsettling and depressing an effect.

I do not know of course whether such a plan would be accepted by either government. I think, however, that each of them could assent to it without the slightest derogation to its dignity, and that if either of them received it, upon proper presentation, even with an informal manifestation of favor, the way would easily be open to a mutual understanding concerning it. At any rate, it seems to me worth the while of a public-spirited and patriotic body like this, and of other friends of peace here or abroad, to consider its expediency, and at the close of my remarks I shall move a tentative resolution to that effect, in addition to the one now pending.

I repeat, I am for peace—not, indeed, peace at any price, but peace with honor. Let us understand, however, what the honor of this great American Republic consists in. We are a very powerful people even without an army or navy immediately ready for action; we are, in some respects, the most powerful people on earth. We enjoy peculiar advantages of inestimable value. We are not only richer than any European nation in men, in wealth and in resources yet undeveloped, but we are the only nation that has a free hand, having no dangerous neighbors and no outlying and exposed possessions to take care of. We are, in our continental position, substantially unassailable. A hostile navy may destroy what commercial fleet we have, blockade our ports and even bombard our seaboard towns. This would be painful enough, but it would only be scratching our edges. It would not touch a vital point. No foreign power or possible combination could attack us on land without being overwhelmed on our own soil by immensely superior numbers. We are the best fitted, not, perhaps, for a war of quick decision, but for a long war. Better than any other nation we can, if need be, live on our own fat. We enjoy the advantage of not having spent our resources during long periods of peace on armaments of tremendous cost without immediate use for them, but we would have those resources unimpaired in time of war to be used during the conflict. Substantially unassailable in our continental fastness, and bringing our vast resources into play with the patriotic spirit and the inventive genius and energy of our people, we would, on sea as well as on land, for offensive as well as defensive warfare, be stronger the second year of a war than the first, and stronger the third than the second, and so on. Owing to this superiority of our staying power, a war with the United States would be to any foreign nation practically a war without end. No foreign power or possible combination in the Old World can, therefore, considering in addition to all this the precarious relations of every one of them with other powers and its various exposed interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the United States, and none of them will, unless we force it to do so. They will, on the contrary, carefully avoid such a quarrel as long as they can, and we may be confident that without firing a

gun, and even without having many guns ready for firing, we shall always see our rights respected and our demands, if they are just and proper, may be, after some diplomatic sparring, at last fully complied with.

What is the rule of honor to be observed by a power so strong and so advantageously situated as this republic is. Of course, I do not expect it meekly to pocket real insults if they should be offered to it. But surely it should not, as our boyish jingos wish it to do, swagger about among the nations of the world, with a chip on its shoulder, and shaking its fist in everybody's face. Of course, I should not tamely submit to encroachments upon its rights. But surely it should not, whenever its own notions of right or interest collide with the notions of others, fall into hysterics and act as if it really feared for its own security and its very independence. As a true gentleman, conscious of his strength and his dignity, it should be slow to take offence. In its dealings with other nations it should have scrupulous regard, not only for their rights, but also for their self-respect. With all its latent resources for war, it should be the great peace power of the world. It should never forget what a proud privilege and what an inestimable blessing it is not to need and not to have big armies and navies to support. It should seek to influence mankind, not by heavy artillery, but by good example and wise counsel. It should see its highest glory, not in battles won, but in wars prevented. It should be so invariably just and fair, so trustworthy, so good-tempered, so conciliatory, that other nations would instinctively turn to it as their mutual friend and the natural adjuster of their differences, thus making it the greatest preserver of the world's peace.

This is not a mere idealistic fancy. It is the natural position of this great republic among the nations of the earth. It is its noblest vocation, and it will be a glorious day for the United States when the good sense and the self-respect of the American people see in this their "manifest destiny." It all rests upon peace. Is not this peace with honor? There has of late been much loose speech about "Americanism." Is not this good Americanism? It is surely to-day the Americanism of those who love their country most. And I fervently hope that it will be and ever remain the Americanism of our children and children's children.

#### THE VENEZUELAN CONTROVERSY.

BY HON. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

From the Boston Herald.

In the Monroe doctrine itself, for reasons which will at once suggest themselves to those acquainted with its history, I naturally take an hereditary interest. But upon that doctrine I do not now propose to touch. My present purpose is to call attention to what seems to be the serious confusion of ideas which exists as to the reason of the position now taken by those who are not in sympathy with President Cleveland in his recent message. In any enunciation of the Monroe doctrine, as of any other doctrine, two separate questions are involved—one a question of matter, the other, of manner. I have read many—not all—of the communications which have recently appeared in the press, both in support of and in opposition to the attitude assumed by President Cleveland. I have talked with many persons who felt a deep interest in the subject. Among those disposed to criticise the

President, however, I have almost uniformly found that their objection lay rather to the manner in which his position was set forth than to the position itself. Those whom I have heard discuss the subject — no matter to what degree they might differ from the President and secretary of state — have uniformly agreed that their contentions were fair subjects for diplomatic and international discussion. They were not, by Americans at least, to be characterized in violent language or summarily set aside. If, therefore, President Cleveland, in his message, had recommended that, in view of the unfortunate course of Lord Salisbury in declining arbitration — a course which all Americans, and, I think, most Englishmen, would agree in deploring — if the President had recommended that, in view of this decision of Lord Salisbury, an advisory commission should be appointed to ascertain as correctly as might be the true boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela, and that subsequently, if Great Britain insisted upon a forcible taking beyond that line, the ulterior course to be pursued would become matter for grave consideration on the part of the United States — such a position, if taken in that form, would have received almost universal support. It would have commended itself to the minds, not only of the people of this country, but to the mass of Europeans as well. So expressed, it would have been couched in the careful language of the original Monroe doctrine, and open to no criticism. The hand of iron in the velvet glove.

In international relations, good manners and a formal and restrained utterance are important elements. It is at least fairly open to question whether President Cleveland appreciated the force of his own words, or the impression they would naturally create in minds accustomed to diplomatic utterances. It may be well at times to be “up-and-down” and “outspoken;” but it is questionable whether much is gained by that method, when used in somewhat pronounced violation of all accepted usage. In ordinary life it is not the loud-voiced man who usually carries the most weight.

Moreover the President's attitude seems to have been open to another serious objection. Closing his message in somewhat peremptory language, he declared that, though war was a great calamity, no calamity was so great as for a nation supinely to submit to humiliation, or words to that effect. This may or may not be true in the abstract; and of that I shall have something more to say presently. Meanwhile, by making use of language of this exceptional strength and directness, did not the President place Great Britain, and, perhaps, the United States, in an unnecessarily difficult position? How, in presence of a threat of this character, can Great Britain withdraw from the unfortunate attitude, as I consider it, which Lord Salisbury has assumed, without “supinely submitting to humiliation”? In which case, high authority assures us, war would be far the lesser calamity. There is an ancient saying in regard to the sauce for the one being sauce for the other; and, when those voicing great nations get to exchanging threats, it seems of doubtful expediency unnecessarily to make a bed for one's self which one's opponent cannot possibly lie in.

But perhaps this can best be illustrated by another historical instance not remote — indeed, still fresh in the minds of all civilized nations. In 1870 the French applied what might be termed the Franco-Monroe doctrine to the case of Spain. It will be remembered that the throne of Spain either then was offered, or it was supposed might be offered, to one of the members of the royal family of

Prussia. Louis Napoleon thereupon instantly applied the Franco-Monroe doctrine to the case, and demanded that the candidacy should be withdrawn. Thereupon the candidacy was withdrawn. Meanwhile, the French war spirit was aroused, and, like President Cleveland, considering that, though war was a great calamity, no calamity was so great as for a nation “supinely to submit to humiliation,” the French further flung the challenge in the face of Germany by insisting upon a formal declaration that, not only then, but under no circumstances, should a member of the German royal house be a candidate for the Spanish throne. The result is well known. It is fairly to be presumed from his language that President Cleveland would now maintain that it was better for the French to have sustained the disgrace of Sedan, the siege of Paris, the horrors of the Commune, and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, than, by not taking the course they did, to have “supinely submitted to humiliation.” Nevertheless, calmer observers may consider the matter open to serious doubt. Had France at that time, instead of insisting upon the very spirited but quite unusual course which was pursued, adopted the ordinary diplomatic language, and been satisfied with the usual assurances between nations, the course of French history might not impossibly have been different from what it was, and, on the whole, as satisfactory to France.

Again, those, so far as I have met with them and talked with them, who are disposed to criticise the attitude assumed by President Cleveland, find in it cause for regret because of the changed bearing of this country. Of all the great peoples in the world, we Americans only had, for more than thirty years, walked among the nations of the earth unarmed and not afraid. When the war of the rebellion closed, wisely as I think — foolishly, as is now suggested by many — the United States disbanded its army, laid up its battleships, and devoted itself to ways of peace. The results speak for themselves — to some, satisfactorily; to others, apparently not. Meanwhile, the other nations of the world, especially of Europe, have during that period gone on loading themselves down with every conceivable weapon of warfare, until to-day they are notoriously crushed by their armaments. Among those nations the United States has occupied much the position of that unarmed man we so often see, who, relying simply upon his acknowledged strength, his peaceful attitude and his friendly feeling, walks without fear where others deem it necessary to bristle with weapons. It would be difficult to point to any very considerable injury, or even loss of consideration, that has resulted to us from so doing. On the contrary, in the position we had taken on this subject, the advantage was confessedly ours. We made it our boast. All see that, during the twentieth century, disarmament must come in some form — whether through bankruptcy, or as the result of more destructive warfare, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is a result which every thoughtful observer believes to be inevitable. Instinctively foreseeing this result, the United States had made itself the great exponent of arbitration. All that was required, as we believe, and some of us still think, was a quiet, firm, manly persistence in this course, relying solely on the moral influence the unarmed man can best exert, to accomplish the great result in view.

To those who felt thus — and they are many — it was, therefore, a sight which occasioned sentiments to which the word humiliation is not too strong to apply, when, suddenly, President Cleveland — our mouthpiece among nations — rushed into the arena, and Congress followed

him, declaring that this notoriously unarmed country was ready on the instant to fight the world in advocacy of measures looking to peace. The sentiment, as it has reached me, was much what would have been expected if some particularly quiet, though corporally large, business man, who had been chiefly known for his objection to street affrays and pugilistic encounters, had suddenly rushed out of his counting room, and, tearing off his coat, flung his hat into the gutter, and announced his readiness to fight Mr. John Lawrence Sullivan for a shilling. The spectacle would not be edifying.

Moreover, from another point of view, it has its mortifying side. Few things of recent occurrence are more suggestive than the different manner in which the attitude taken by the United States in regard to Venezuela, and that taken by the Emperor of Germany in regard to South Africa, have been received in Europe. While the message of the President raised in Great Britain but a mild, and what cannot be considered otherwise than a quiet and dignified discussion, the position of the Emperor of Germany was apparently received with an explosion of surprise and wrath. It was much as if the mind of England had, by a species of quiet, tacit consent, let it be known that such an attitude was to be accepted almost as a matter of course from America, and might mean either some party exigency, or a bid for popularity through that extreme twisting of the lion's tail which is a favorite device of American public characters of a certain calibre, and, therefore, not to be taken seriously, while, on the other hand, from the Emperor of Germany better things were to be expected. He at least had been properly brought up, and ought to know what language meant. That such a view as this should apparently have been taken not only in London, but in most of the capitals of the civilized world, seems to many the reverse of flattering to national pride. Few like to be classed among boors.

But my purpose, as I said, is to call attention to the fact that all the points I have raised are matters of manner connected with the discussion now going on, and not questions going to the essence of the positions our recognized representatives have assumed. Why it should be taken for granted that those who may consider that in international dealings, as in dealings between individuals, courtesy is not incompatible with firmness, and that good manners do not necessarily indicate cowardice, thereby "consent to betray the American cause," is not immediately apparent. May it not arise from a combination of too much epithet and not enough reflection? It was the late Rufus Choate, if I recollect right, who once referred to a certain brother at the bar as a "bulldog with confused ideas;" and may it not be that an unusual attitude on the part of responsible public officials and the use of language fortunately not ordinarily heard in international correspondence, can arouse a spirit, whether in France of 1870, or in the United States of 1896, that assumes the character of a bulldog with confused ideas; and yet all the trouble may be due to the manner in which the discussion is carried on, and not in any essential degree to the matter involved in it.

## AMONG THE PAPERS.

### HARPER'S WEEKLY.

Assuming, however, that the American people are able and willing to bear all these loads—what would they get

in return that they cannot get otherwise? For what purpose, let us ask our jingos, do they want to acquire outlying possessions, "outposts," "strategical keys," and the like, all over the world, which require the maintenance of big armaments? Of course, only to guard our "rights," and especially our commerce. Now, we ask them to look over our past history and then tell us whether, ever since the war of 1812, our rights have not been successfully maintained, and our commerce has not had all the necessary protection, although we did not have outlying possessions, or outposts, or keys, or a big navy? Is it not true that we have not had to suffer any insult, that our foreign commerce has been unmolested, and has freely expanded wherever the enterprise of our merchants chose to carry it, and that if it has not expanded more it was because our merchants did not carry it any farther, and also because its development was hampered by our home policy? And if this was the case while we were a much feebler nation than at present, why should we be hysterical about it since we have become in some respects the most powerful nation in the world?

We have tried the "outpost" policy once—in Samoa. There was much excitement about it, and at one time we were on the verge of a war with Germany in consequence of it. We carried our point diplomatically and got a "foothold" there. And what benefit have we derived from it? Not the slightest. It has only involved us in irksome responsibilities which we cannot too soon get rid of. And as to Hawaii, what commercial advantages can we expect to have that we have not already, and that no other nation will take away from us at the risk of a dangerous quarrel? None whatever. And the advantages we do enjoy, in Hawaii as well as elsewhere, we have without being burdened with the slightest responsibility for anything outside of our continental stronghold. Why, then, this shouting for a policy of needless adventure and costly armaments to support it? Are the American people so senselessly tired of their precious privilege and their glorious distinction of being the only great nation in the world which does not consume its substance by the support of great war establishments that they should sacrifice this blessing not only without gaining anything for it, but for the certainty of becoming needlessly involved in the quarrels of the outside world, of giving up their best political traditions, and of forfeiting the boon of peaceful development? Of all the freaks of our time this jingo statesmanship is the silliest and most reckless.

There is more Catarrh in this section of the country than all other diseases put together, and until the last few years was supposed to be incurable. For a great many years doctors pronounced it a local disease, and prescribed local remedies, and by constantly failing to cure with local treatment, pronounced it incurable. Science has proven catarrh to be a constitutional disease, and, therefore, requires constitutional treatment. Hall's Catarrh Cure, manufactured by F. J. Cheney & Co., Toledo, Ohio, is the only constitutional cure on the market. It is taken internally in doses from 10 drops to a teaspoonful. It acts directly on the blood and mucous surfaces of the system. They offer one hundred dollars for any case it fails to cure. Send for circulars and testimonials. Address,

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